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There is some controversy regarding the key sources of success in the private equity business 
model and on how this business model affects the portfolio companies. Does this success 
come from value creation or from value transfer? On the one hand, scholars agree that private 
equity investors create value by implementing a superior corporate governance mechanism 
and due to the disciplining role of additional debt resulting from the transaction financing. On 
the other hand, some scholars and especially some politicians point out potential negative 
effects of increased indebtedness of portfolio companies and argue that private equity 
investors rather transfer value from stakeholders or taxpayers than create it. Political debates 
are often led by concerns about harmful effects of excessive debt levels and higher 
bankruptcy risks in companies which undergo buyout transactions.  
 
We investigate financial distress risks of European companies around their buyout event in 
the period 2000 - 2008. In addition, we analyze whether private equity-backed companies go 
bankrupt more often than comparable companies without private equity investments. Our 
paper suggests that private equity investors select companies which are less financially 
distressed than comparable companies prior to the transaction and that the distress risks 
increase after the buyout. However, the distress risk in private equity-backed companies does 
not exceed the distress risk in comparable companies three years after the buyout. Despite this 
risk increase, private equity-backed companies do not suffer from higher bankruptcy rates 
than the control group. Even those companies subject to buyouts in years with favorable debt 
market conditions do not suffer from higher bankruptcy rates than other private equity-backed 
and non-private equity-backed companies. Our results further lend support to the hypothesis 
that firms backed by experienced private equity investors achieve even lower bankruptcy 
probability compared to firms backed by inexperienced investors and to firms without private 
equity investments. Experienced investors seem to be better able to manage distress risks than 
their inexperienced counterparts. 
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Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die Quellen des Erfolges im Businessmodell der Private Equity-Investoren sowie die Frage 
nach dem Einfluss dieser Investoren auf ihre Portfoliounternehmen stehen im Mittelpunkt 
kontroverser Diskussionen. Ist der Erfolg auf eine Wertschöpfung oder auf einen 
Wertetransfer durch die Private Equity-Investoren zurückzuführen? Einerseits tragen  die 
Investoren zur Wertsteigerung in den Portfoliounternehmen durch das Implementieren eines 
anreizkompatiblen Corporate Governance Mechanismus bei. Hierzu gehört auch die 
zusätzliche Verschuldung, die aus der Transaktionsfinanzierung resultiert und die eine 
disziplinierende Rolle auf das Management des Portfoliounternehmens ausübt. Im Gegensatz 
zu diesen positiven Effekten wird sowohl in der Forschung als auch in politischen 
Diskussionen auf die möglichen negativen Wirkungen der erhöhten Verschuldung der 
Portfoliounternehmen hingewiesen und es wird argumentiert, dass Private Equity-Investoren 
eher Werte von anderen Beteiligten transferieren statt sie zu generieren. Die politische 
Debatte wird durch die Sorge über schädigende Effekte der übermäßigen Verschuldung und 
höheren Insolvenzrisiken von Portfoliounternehmen geleitet.  
 
Wir untersuchen die finanziellen Schwierigkeiten in Unternehmen, die in eine Buyout-
Transaktion im Zeitraum 2000-2008 in Europa involviert waren. Darüber hinaus analysieren 
wir, ob diese Unternehmen höhere Insolvenzraten als vergleichbare Unternehmen ohne 
Private Equity-Investoren aufweisen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Private Equity-Investoren 
diejenigen Unternehmen auswählen, die finanziell gut aufgestellt sind. Die finanzielle Lage 
dieser Unternehmen verschärft sich nach dem Buyout. Dennoch sind die Risiken von 
finanziellen Schwierigkeiten in Portfoliounternehmen drei Jahre nach der Transaktion nicht 
höher als in vergleichbaren Unternehmen ohne Private Equity-Investoren. Ebenfalls die 
Insolvenzraten unter Portfoliounternehmen sind nicht höher als unter Unternehmen ohne 
Private Equity-Investoren. Ferner deuten die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass 
Portfoliounternehmen mit erfahrenen Private Equity-Investoren eine niedrigere 
Insolvenzwahrscheinlichkeit aufweisen als Portfoliounternehmen mit unerfahrenen Investoren 
und als Unternehmen ohne Private Equity-Beteiligung. Es scheint, dass erfahrene Investoren 
besser als unerfahrene Investoren in der Lage sind, finanzielle Risiken zu managen. 
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Some financial investors do not waste any thoughts on the people whose jobs they destroy.
They remain anonymous, do not have a face, pounce upon companies like swarms of
locusts, graze on them and continue on their way. We are fighting against this form of
capitalism.
Franz Muentefering (2005), former chairman of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in
Germany
1 Introduction
There is some controversy regarding the key sources of success in the private equity (PE)
model. Does this success come from value creation or from value transfer? Most scholars
agree that PE investors create value by increasing productivity and profitability of their
portfolio companies (e.g., Kaplan, 1989, Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990, Smith, 1990, Davis
et al., 2008, or Harris et al., 2005). Starting with Jensen (1986 and 1989) many researchers
demonstrate that these improvements result from a superior governance model that PE
investors implement in their portfolio companies. An essential part of this superior gover-
nance model is a disciplining role of debt. Debt prevents managers from wasting resources,
i.e., from excessively investing free cash-flows in projects with negative net present values,
because the managers are forced to repay the loans.
Some scholars point out potential negative effects of debt level increases in buyout compa-
nies and argue that PE investors rather transfer value from other stakeholders than create
it. Higher debt levels boost tax shields, which raise PE returns (Guo et al., 2011) and
represent a transfer from taxpayers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is not uncommon
for PE investors to increase debt levels in order to pay out special dividends for them-
selves (dividend recaps), which may be viewed as a transfer from other shareholders.1 In
addition, increases in debt levels lead to a higher risk of financial distress and bankruptcy
1The Wall Street Journal reports that between 2003 and mid-2006, US PE-backed companies raised
USD 69 billion additional debt “primarily to pay dividends to private equity owners” (Greg Ip & Henny
Sender, Private money: the new financial order, Wall Street Journal, 25 July 2006, p. A1). An example
of such a transaction is the case of Debenhams. This company was taken private in 2003 by a syndicate
of CVC, Texas Pacific Group, and Merrill Lynch Private Equity with a package comprising approximately
£1.4 billion of debt and £600m of equity. It was twice refinanced with debt. As a consequence, debt
increased to £1.9 billion. These refinancings allowed £1.2 billion (twice the original equity stake) to be
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(e.g., Kaplan and Stein, 1993), harming other companies’ shareholders and debthold-
ers. Finally, PE investors may transfer value from the “financial system”, as increases in
bankruptcy rates may negatively affect financial institutions providing transaction financ-
ing. Policy debates are often led by concerns about harmful effects of excessive debt levels,
increased financial distress risks and bankruptcy rates in companies which undergo buyout
transactions and by concerns about potential broader negative implications on financial
institutions and the stability of the financial system when large buyout credits fail.
We contribute to this discussion by investigating financial distress risk and bankruptcy
rates of European companies around their buyouts in the period 2000 - 2008. Thus, we
add to a growing literature documenting the real effects of PE financing. We shed some
light on the potential negative effects of PE financing, whereas the existing literature
predominantly focuses on the positive side of PE financing, such as links between PE
investment and operating performance (e.g., Guo et al., 2011, Davis et al., 2009, Kaplan,
1989), PE investment and employment (e.g., Davis et al., 2008, 2009, Cressy et al., 2007,
Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990) or PE investment and innovation (e.g., Lerner et al., 2011,
Popov and Roosenboom, 2009). Our research is also related to the recent literature that
investigates how debt market conditions affect the capital structure in PE transactions.
Axelson et al. (2010) find that when debt market conditions are favorable, PE investors
increase debt levels. We add to this strand of research by analyzing whether companies
subject to buyouts in favorable market conditions face a higher risk of bankruptcy than
comparable non-buyout companies or than companies that are subject to buyouts in less
favorable market conditions.
Our paper is also related to a vast literature addressing the issue of how syndication
behavior and investors’ experience affect portfolio companies. It is a priori not clear how
syndication and experience are related to financial distress risks and bankruptcy rates. Our
research contributes to filling this research gap. As to syndication, syndicates are ready
to invest in more risky companies and strategies than stand-alone investors (Filatotchev
et al., 2006) on the one hand. This may result in higher bankruptcy rates of companies
backed by syndicates. On the other hand, syndicates are endowed with more resources than
stand-alone investors. They can use these resources to prevent their portfolio companies
“taken out of Debenhams” and returned to the PE syndicate as a “special dividend” (Jonathan Braude,
Debenhams to make debut, TheDeal.com, 21 April 2006).
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from experiencing financial difficulties. If the latter effect prevails, we will observe lower
bankruptcy rates in companies backed by syndicates.
As to experience, there are at least three arguments for why we expect experienced PE
investors to be associated with lower financial distress risks and bankruptcy rates. First,
an inexperienced investor may want to “show up” by investing in more risky companies
and strategies, which possess a higher upside potential, but which more often end in
financial distress and bankruptcy. Second, experienced investors have better know-how
and instruments to avoid bankruptcy than inexperienced investors. One of the essential
reasons is that they have easier access to loans (e.g., Demiroglu and James, 2010, Ivashina
and Kovner, 2011). Third, experienced investors want to maintain their reputational stake
vis a vis their capital providers and vis a vis financial institutions, which provide debt
financing. Therefore, they have more incentives to avoid bankruptcy than inexperienced
investors with a lower reputational stake. But there is also at least one argument in the
opposite direction. Experienced investors may be better able to transfer value, for example
through dividend recaps, because they have greater bargaining power, better negotiation
skills and superior information compared to inexperienced investors, which may increase
the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy in their portfolio companies.
Another contribution of our paper is that we provide a more comprehensive picture of the
role of PE investors than many other existing studies, which often analyze investors or
companies from a single country or which focus on listed companies only. In contrast to
most of the aforementioned studies, our study includes several countries and we collect
data on privately held companies. In addition, our sample including information on a large
number of buyout as well as non-byuout companies and the pre- and post-buyout char-
acteristics of the former group makes the identification of a causal effect more compelling
than in most previous studies. To take into account that PE targets are not randomly
chosen, we employ a matching procedure, a panel approach and, finally, an instrumental
variable approach.
We start with a sample covering more than 8 million companies from 15 countries. From
this sample, we consider all buyout transactions and select comparable control firms. We
focus on European transactions within the time horizon 2000-2008 because after the begin-
ning of the new millennium, PE transactions spread more and more throughout Europe.
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According to Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2009), 49% of the target enterprise value in buyout
transactions were concentrated in Europe, compared to 44% in the US and Canada during
the period 2000-2004. A more technical reason for our focus on European companies is that
we need accounting data for these companies in order to measure their financial distress
risk. Unfortunately, most PE transactions involve privately held companies, which are
not required to disclose financial information in the US. In contrast, European companies
have relatively stringent disclosure requirements.
Our results suggest that PE investors select firms which have a lower financial distress risk
than comparable companies and that the financial distress risk increases after the buyout
transaction. However, the financial distress risk in buyout companies does not exceed
the distress risk in comparable companies three years after the buyout. In addition,
our findings indicate that buyout companies do not suffer from bankruptcy more often
than comparable non-buyout companies. This seems to be true even for buyouts taking
place under favorable debt market conditions. Our results further lend support to the
hypothesis that PE investors even decrease a company’s bankruptcy probability when
they are experienced.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section summarizes the
background and related literature. In Section 3 we describe financial distress risk measures.
Section 4 gives an overview of the data. Section 5 analyzes the relationship between PE
financing and financial distress. In Section 6, we investigate the relationship between PE
financing and bankruptcy rates. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical background: Financial distress and bankruptcy
2.1 Impact of PE investors
PE transactions are typically characterized by an increase in debt levels (e.g., Kaplan,
1989). The obligation to service this debt can be viewed as a positive or a negative
outcome.
On the positive side, large debt levels discipline managers who might otherwise have
incentives to invest in projects with a negative net present value (e.g., Jensen, 1986).
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PE investors may limit the waste of free cash-flow and in this way increase the portfolio
companies’ efficiency and productivity.
On the negative side, high debt levels may increase the risk of financial distress and
bankruptcy. Kaplan and Stein (1993), who analyze large US buyouts completed in the late
1980s, suggest that high debt levels may have increased bankruptcy likelihoods. Extensive
literature documents that market and business cycles and, in particular, the relative price
of debt vs. equity affect the level of PE activity and the use of debt (e.g., Phalippou and
Zollo, 2005, Guo et al., 2011, Axelson et al., 2010). When debt becomes cheaper relative to
equity, PE investors are able to increase their returns by raising debt levels (e.g., Kaplan
and Stro¨mberg, 2009). Thus, we may observe higher bankruptcy risks after the buyout
and also compared to non-buyout companies, in particular when debt market conditions
are favorable.
2.2 Impact of PE syndication
There are several reasons to believe that syndicates choose companies with different finan-
cial characteristics than stand-alone investors and that the development of these companies
after the buyout event differs.
One might expect syndicates to be willing to invest in more risky companies than stand-
alone investors (e.g., Filatotchev et al., 2006) because they will be better able to manage
these risks for at least three reasons. First, when investors have access to different sources
of information, syndication delivers a second opinion on the future prospects of the com-
pany (e.g., Lerner, 1994, Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007), which leads to a better
selection and may limit the risk that a particular company ends in bankruptcy. Second,
when investors combine their complementary skills, syndication may result in more in-
tense monitoring and higher-quality support during the investment phase (e.g., Cumming
and Walz, 2010, Brander et al., 2002, Tian, 2011), which further reduces the likelihood
of bankruptcy. Third, a syndicate of PE investors has a larger potential pool of financial
resources than a stand-alone investor to help a portfolio company when it experiences
financial difficulties.
These benefits only show to advantage if they outweigh syndication cost. Syndication is a
complex process which usually gives rise to agency problems emerging from information
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asymmetries within the syndicate (Wright and Lockett, 2003). In some situations, one
investor possesses more information about the quality of the deal. If this is the case, this
investor may be inclined to take a less informed partner on board only for low-quality
deals, which in turn leads to adverse selection. In other settings, syndication may result
in moral hazard and free riding problems since the investors do not mutually observe their
efforts in portfolio companies’ monitoring and support. All these problems are potentially
aggravated when companies are in financial distress. Despite the existence of “drag along”
and other covenants, coordination between PE investors might thus be difficult when a
restructuring of financially distressed buyouts is required (e.g., Citron and Wright, 2008).
Therefore, syndicates might prefer to invest in less distressed companies and may also be
less able to avoid financial distress and bankruptcy.
2.3 Impact of PE experience
We conjecture that PE experience shapes the choice of buyout targets with certain financial
characteristics as well as their post-buyout development.
One might expect that inexperienced investors tend to invest in more risky companies in
order to “show up”. These companies fail more often, but, with a low probability, they
may turn into an impressive success story. Inexperienced PE investors may want to bet
on this success to become visible for their capital providers and for financial institutions
providing debt financing. But even if they invested in similar companies as experienced
investors, there would be several reasons for us to expect a higher risk of financial dis-
tress and bankruptcy with inexperienced investors. It may be easier for experienced PE
investors to react when a company gets into financial difficulties because they obtain loans
on more favorable conditions than their inexperienced counterparts (e.g., Demiroglu and
James, 2010, Ivashina and Kovner, 2011). In addition, experienced investors have a higher
stake of reputational capital to protect, which makes them more eager to avoid bankrupt-
cies within their portfolio companies than inexperienced investors. Finally, experienced
PE investors have superior selection and value-adding abilities, which leads to higher suc-
cess rates. Sorensen (2007) suggests that more experienced investors make more successful
investments in terms of investing in better companies which are more likely to go public.
Nahata (2008) shows that companies backed by more experienced and reputable venture
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capitalists are more likely to exit successfully (via trade sale or IPO). Inexperienced in-
vestors realize a higher fraction of unsuccessful exits, i.e. liquidations.
Alternatively, the risk of distress and bankruptcy may be higher with experienced than
with inexperienced investors because experienced investors have a higher bargaining power,
better negotiation skills and superior information. In addition, they are able to obtain more
debt financing from financial institutions than their inexperienced counterparts, which
they may use to increase debt levels and, thus, risks in their portfolio companies. All in
all, experienced PE investors may be better able to transfer value from other stakeholders.
3 Financial distress risk measures
The literature uses two approaches to measure companies’ financial distress. The first
approach is based on accounting data. In general, ratios measuring profitability, liquidity,
and solvency prevail as the most significant indicators. The second approach relies on
stock market data (or their combination with accounting data). For our sample of mostly
private firms we rely on the first approach. We employ indices which have been designed
for or can easily be adapted to private firms. These are: Zmijewski-score (Zmijewski,
1984), O-score (Ohlson, 1980, Griffin and Lemmon, 2002), and Z-score (Altman, 1968)
and its extension for private firms (Altman, 2002).
Zmijewski-score equals:
ZM = −4.336 − 4.513 · NITA + 5.679 · TLTA + 0.004 · CACL ,
with NI being net income (profit/loss for period); TA being total assets; TL total liabilities;
CL current liabilities; and CA current assets. A higher Zmijewski-score value indicates a
higher financial distress risk.
We follow the implementation of Ohlson (1980) by Griffin and Lemmon (2002) and com-
pute the O-score as:
O = −1.32− 0.407 · log TA+ 6.03 · TLTA − 1.43 · WCTA + 0.076 · CLCA − 1.72 · TLdummy− 2.37 ·
NI
TA − 1.83 · FFOTL + 0.285 ·NLdummy − 0.521 · NIt−NIt−1|NIt|+|NIt−1| ,
with TA being inflation-adjusted total assets; TL total liabilities; WC working capital;
CL current liabilities; CA current assets; TLdummy being 1 if total liabilities are higher
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than total assets, zero otherwise; NLdummy being 1 if the company realized a net loss in
the last two years, zero otherwise; NI being net income (profit/loss for period); and FFO
being funds from operations. A higher O-score value is associated with a higher financial
distress risk.
Finally, the Z-score is defined as:
Z = 0.717 · WCTA + 0.847 · retEARNINGSTA + 3.107 · EBITTA + 0.420 · MVTL + 0.998 · SALESTA ,
with WC being working capital; TA total assets; retEARNINGS retained earnings; EBIT
earnings before interest and taxes; MV market value of equity; TL total liabilities; and
SALES sales. The five subratios which form this score reflect (i) liquid assets in relation
to company size, (ii) profitability, (iii) operating efficiency apart from tax and leveraging
factors, (iv) market dimension, (v) sales turnover. We lack data to calculate two of these
subratios and employ other shareholder funds instead of retained retained earnings in (ii)
and book value instead of market value in (iv). The higher the value of the Z-score, the
less financially distressed the company.2
4 Data
Our sample consists of buyout and non-buyout companies from the EU-15 countries. We
obtain accounting data on companies operating in these countries from Amadeus database,
which contains detailed information from balance sheets and profit/loss accounts for more
than 18 million European companies. We exclude companies for which we do not find
accounting information. We obtain the information of whether a company has been subject
to a buyout from Zephyr database, which contains information on over 600,000 mergers &
acquisitions, private equity and venture capital transactions, and initial public offerings.3
We exclude non-buyout companies from those country-industry4-year groups in which we
do not observe any buyouts. We consider buyout companies only until the year of PE
2Altman defines the following zones of discrimination: Z > 2.9 - safe zone, 1.23 < Z < 2.9 - grey zone,
Z < 1.23 - distress zone.
3Scholars working in the field of private equity and venture capital have become aware of the existence
of this database in recent years (e.g., Goossens et al., 2008, Abdesselam et al., 2008, Bloom et al., 2009,
Brav et al., 2009, Beuselinck et al., 2009, Prijcker et al., 2009, Schertler and Tykvova´, 2011).
4Industries are 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes.
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investor’s exit. We provide a list of variables we use in this paper with their descriptions
and sources in Appendix 1.
4.1 Buyouts
From Zephyr database, we extract all completed transactions from the period between
2000 and 2008 in the EU-15 countries classified as “institutional buyout”. We add all ac-
quisitions with transaction financing described as “private equity” or “leveraged buyout”,
which were undertaken either by a financial sponsor or by an acquirer whose business
description includes the term “private equity”. We exclude minority deals. We also re-
move secondary buyouts since these transactions may involve different types of companies
and may have different consequences for financial distress risk and bankruptcy probability
than primary buyouts. We end up with 1,842 buyouts.
Table 1 reports the composition of the buyout sample by year, country and industry. It
shows that the majority of buyouts take place in 2007 after a continuous increase since
2002. In 2008 the deal frequency dropped as a consequence of the financial crisis. The
largest buyout markets are the United Kingdom and France. Most transactions (34%)
take place in the manufacturing industry.
We split the buyouts into subsamples of syndicated and stand-alone transactions as well
as subsamples of transactions by experienced and inexperienced PE investors. Almost
19% of the transactions are syndicated and about 50% of the buyouts are carried out by
experienced PE investors.
We classify a buyout as a syndicated transaction if the number of acquirers is disclosed and
is larger than one. We classify it as a stand-alone transaction if the number of acquirers
is disclosed and equals one. Those buyouts for which we do not have information on the
number of investors (since the names of the acquirers are missing completely or are not
explicitly disclosed, e.g., when a management buyout team or private individuals buy the
company) cannot be assigned to either of the subsamples. Therefore, the sum of both
subsamples’ counts is lower than the total number of buyouts.
We build the subsamples of buyouts by experienced and inexperienced PE investors by
considering the average experience of all PE investors involved in a particular deal. The
experience of each PE investor in a particular transaction is proxied by the number of all
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(worldwide) transactions this PE investor carried out prior to the transaction concerned.
If the “name” of the investor is management buyout team, private individuals, or similar
(i.e., there is information in this field, but the name is not explicitly disclosed), we set the
experience equal to zero. Our subsample of buyouts by experienced PE investors includes
those buyouts in which the average experience of the participating investors exceeds one.
If it is one or below, it belongs to the subgroup of buyouts by inexperienced PE investors.
If the name is missing completely, we do not assign the company to either of the groups.5
4.2 Control firms
To measure the effect of PE funding on firms’ financial distress and bankruptcy risks,
we analyze differences in the outcomes of the relevant variables of buyout firms and the
outcomes of these variables for comparable non-buyout firms. A crucial feature in the
construction of the counterfactual is the selection of a valid control group.
Randomization of treatment is infeasible in PE investments decisions for several reasons.
The geographical and industry distribution of PE investments is not random. As to the
industry, recent empirical studies suggests that PE funds are usually specialized investors
who prefer investments in certain industries (e.g., Cressy et al., 2007). In addition, after
taking the decision in which country and industry to invest, PE investors undertake an
intensive screening and selection process in order to evaluate the investment strengths
and risks, and to identify the “right” target firm (see Kaplan and Stro¨mberg, 2004) with
specific characteristics. These characteristics may shape financial distress and bankruptcy
risks after the transaction. In addition, companies themselves may, at least to a certain
extent, influence whether or not they obtain PE. To take into account these selection
and self-selection effects, we run a matching procedure and identify “similar” non-buyout
control firms to each buyout firm.
We employ propensity score matching, as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The
goal of this matching approach is to find ”twin” firms which have similar characteristics
as buyouts but were not acquired by a PE investor during the period under consideration.
In order to identify a set of companies which do not differ significantly from the sample of
5Our results are robust towards excluding those companies for which the names of investors are not
explicitly disclosed.
10
buyouts in specific criteria, we first split the whole sample into 945 country-industry-year
subsamples and run separate propensity score logit regressions in each subsample. By
matching buyouts to controls in the same country and industry (1-digit NACE Rev. 2),
year by year, we mitigate concerns that a non-random country/industry/time distribution
of the buyouts could affect the results. We apply three-to-one nearest-neighbor matching
with replacement. For each buyout firm we identify three control firms with similar size
and age in the year prior to the transaction. Our final sample includes 5,342 control firms.6
Table 2, Panel A delivers summary statistics on size, age, and our three distress risk mea-
sures for buyouts, control firms and all non-buyouts. Panel B suggests that the balancing
property condition is fulfilled, i.e., the propensity scores for buyouts and non-buyouts do
not differ significantly. We provide a detailed description of the matching procedure in
Appendix 2.
5 Empirical results: Financial distress
Table 3 gives an overview of our three financial distress risk scores as well as their annual
changes for buyouts and for control firms. All three scores indicate that buyout investors
typically select companies with lower financial distress risks. The distress risk levels in
the control group always exceed the distress risk levels in the buyout group in the year
preceding the buyout year. For the O-score and the Z-score, but not for the Zmijewski-
score, this is also true for the second year preceding the transaction. All three measures
suggest that the distress risk increases significantly between the year preceding the buyout
and three years after the buyout. On the contrary, for control companies, distress risk
decreases as they grow older. Three years after the transaction, the buyout and control
companies reach comparable distress risk levels.
In the next step we run multivariate panel regressions to investigate PE investors’ im-
pact in more detail. We include all years of all buyout and control companies in this
analysis. We employ firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant and unobservable
firm and industry characteristics. Moreover, we use year dummy variables to account for
time-varying conditions such as the debt market situation. As errors are unlikely to be
6The number of controls is less than three times the number of buyouts, as one control firm can be
matched to more than one buyout firm (matching with replacement).
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independent, we cluster them by company. We also control for industry concentration by
using a Herfindahl-Hirschman-index. Dummy variable POST indicates the post-buyout
period. For each dependent variable of interest, we estimate two specifications, with and
without a lagged dependent variable. Our results, which we show in Table 4, indicate a
statistically significant increase in financial distress after the buyout for all three measures.
In the following, we focus on the buyout sample only. We first investigate whether there are
differences between syndicated and stand-alone buyouts. Descriptive statistics on the pre-
buyout levels for both subgroups separately (Table 5, Panel A) suggest that syndicates are
better able to handle financially distressed companies than stand-alone investors, who opt
for companies with relatively low risks of financial distress. All three measures indicate that
financial distress risks between syndicated and stand-alone transactions differ significantly
in the year preceding the buyout. Two of the three distress risk measures (Zmijewski-score
and O-score) suggest that this difference still prevails three years after the buyout.
Finally, we investigate how experienced and inexperienced PE investors differ. Table
5, Panel B indicates that both types of investors engage in companies with comparable
financial distress risks. In the year preceding the buyout, the difference between both
groups is insignificant for all three scores. In companies backed by experienced investors,
financial distress risk significantly increases after the buyout. The difference in the financial
distress risk change (during the period between the year preceding the buyout and three
years after the buyout) between experienced and inexperienced investors is statistically
significant only for the Zmijewski-score and the Z-score, but not the O-score.
Some scholars argue that the original financial distress risk models no longer fit with more
recent data and estimate more up-to-date coefficients. To check the robustness of our
results, we employ these alternative coefficient values in additional analyses. We follow
the suggestions by Begley et al. (1996) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) for the Z-score and the
O-score. Moreover, we use coefficients calculated by Shumway (2001), who uses hazard-
rate models, for the Z-score and the Zmijewski-score. In another robustness check, we
investigate whether particular countries, industries or years drive our results. We remove
one country or one industry or one year at a time from the sample and analyze whether
the results change. All in all, these robustness checks (not displayed, but available upon
request) do not alter the main results of our previous analyses.
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6 Empirical results: Bankruptcy
The main potential caveat with our analyses in the previous section is that we have only
investigated distress risks based on accounting figures, but not real distress. In other
words, we have not checked whether companies end in bankruptcy more or less often after
the buyout than comparable non-buyout companies and how bankruptcy rates differ with
different characteristics of PE investments. We address this issue in this section. More
specifically, we analyze how the probability of bankruptcy is related to the buyout event
and to different buyout characteristics (syndicated transactions, stand-alone transactions,
buyouts of experienced and of inexperienced PE investors). In addition, we examine
whether bankruptcies are more common in companies which realized a buyout in years
with favorable debt market conditions. To investigate the impact of debt market conditions
on the behavior of buyout investors, we employ the high-yield spread (see Axelson et
al., 2010), defined as the Europe high-yield rate for the corresponding year according
to the Merrill Lynch High-Yield index minus Libor (both obtained from Datastream).
For our analyses, we distinguish between buyouts in years with favorable vs. unfavorable
conditions, which we measure as high-yield spreads below vs. above their sample period
median. According to this definition, debt market conditions were favorable in the period
2004-2007.
Table 6 depicts the regression results. The dependent variable BANKRUPTCY is binary
and takes a value of one if the firm goes bankrupt in the time period 2000-2010 and zero
otherwise. We obtained information on a failure of our sample firms within this period from
the Orbis database. In all regressions, we control for firm-specific characteristics (age, size)
and for the general economic environment (business confidence indicator, domestic credit
to private sector, real economic growth, severity of the bankruptcy law, and consumer
price index) that may affect bankruptcy likelihood. We also add industry fixed effects.
Column (1) shows the results from a logit estimation with all buyout companies and our
(matched) control companies. Our central variable of interest is the dummy variable BUY-
OUT, which equals one for buyouts and zero otherwise. The marginal effect is insignificant,
which suggests that the bankruptcy likelihood is not higher for buyout companies than
for comparable non-buyout companies.
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In column (2) we adopt an instrumental variable approach as proposed by Ackerberg and
Botticini (2002). The starting point of this approach is the recognition that PE investments
are not random, but are concentrated in certain countries and industries. The availability
of suitable buyout targets in certain countries and industries affects the intensity of PE
financing. Instead of using this recognition for the matching procedure, we employ it as
the basis on which we generate our instruments. This approach has been applied in a
context of bankruptcy analysis by Bhattacharya et al. (2010). Following Bhattacharya
et al. (2010) and Du (2010), we construct local market variables by combining industries
and regions into pairs. By interaction between 9 (1-digit NACE Rev. 2) industries and
15 countries, we obtain 135 local markets which we use as instruments. Bhattacharya et
al. (2010) argue that such instruments are valid because local characteristics should not
directly affect the bankruptcy of a single firm. Similar variables have been used as an
instrument for venture capital financing by e.g., Bottazzi et al. (2008) or Du (2010). This
estimation includes all buyouts and all non-buyout companies, resulting in more than 7
million observations. We only depict the results from the second stage regression. The
coefficient on the buyout dummy is insignificant. Thus, we again conclude that bankruptcy
likelihood is not affected by the buyout event.
Column (3) adds Zmijewski-score as an additional control variable to the first specification.
Its marginal effect is highly statistically significant and positive, as expected, indicating
that higher distress risks are associated with a higher likelihood of bankruptcy. Moreover,
adding the Zmijewski-score does not affect the marginal effect of the buyout variable,
which remains insignificant.
In Columns (4), (5), and (6) we investigate how different types of buyouts are related to
bankruptcy likelihood. We first distinguish between buyouts in favorable and unfavorable
debt market conditions. Our results in Column (4) suggest that even for companies that
are subject to buyouts in years when cheap financing is available, bankruptcy risk does not
exceed the risk of comparable non-buyout companies. Second, we differentiate between
syndicated and stand-alone transactions. Column (5) indicates that neither of the types
affects bankruptcy likelihood. Finally, we distinguish between transactions by experienced
and inexperienced PE investors. The results in Column (6) indicate that experienced PE
investors decrease the likelihood of bankruptcy relative to non-buyout control companies.
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Columns (7), (8), and (9) focus on the buyout sample only. We investigate the differ-
ences between buyouts in favorable vs. unfavorable debt market conditions in Column
(7), between syndicated vs. stand-alone transactions in Column (8), and, finally, between
buyouts of experienced vs. inexperienced PE investors in Column (9). The only difference
we find exists between experienced and inexperienced PE investors. Experienced investors
seem to decrease bankruptcy likelihood (compared to inexperienced investors). Obviously,
experienced investors, who on the one hand increase distress risk in their portfolio com-
panies more than inexperienced investors, are, on the other hand, better able to manage
these risks.
These results are broadly confirmed by the following robustness checks: We employ other
distress risk measures (O-score, Z-score as well as their alternative specifications developed
by Begley et al. (1996), Hillegeist et al. (2004), and Shumway (2001) in our third specifi-
cation. Moreover, we estimate all regressions with these distress risk measures (including
them one by one). In addition, we check whether particular countries, industries or years
drive our results.
7 Conclusion
Our paper lends support to the hypothesis that private equity investors in Europe se-
lected companies with lower financial distress risks as buyout targets during the period
2000-2008. After the buyout, distress risk increased, but did not exceed that of compa-
rable non-buyout companies. We do not find any support for the conjecture that private
equity investors lead their companies into excessive financial distress ending in bankruptcy.
Even those companies subject to buyouts in years when cheap debt financing was available
did not suffer from higher bankruptcy rates than other buyouts and non-buyout compa-
nies. In fact, when buyouts were backed by experienced private equity investors, their
bankruptcy rates were even lower than those of comparable non-buyout companies. Com-
panies backed by experienced investors also had lower bankruptcy rates than companies
that were financed by inexperienced private equity investors, although the distress risk
levels of the former were significantly higher after the buyout event. In addition, syndi-
cates seem to be better able to handle financially distressed companies than stand-alone
investors.
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As our paper covers a dynamic and highly topical issue of private equity investors’ impact,
it contributes not only to academic research, but also to the recent policy discussion on
regulation. Policy makers fear that private equity investors may have adverse effects on
the financial system as a whole and induce contagion effects when large buyout credits
fail. In response to these fears and to the global financial crisis, governments around the
world are rethinking their approach to the regulation of financial institutions and financial
markets, private equity investors being one of the central issues. The U.S. adopted new
rules on hedge funds and private equity in July 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, and
in Europe the AIFM directive on the regulation and supervision of managers of alternative
investment funds was adopted in November 2010. These processes pose many questions
concerning the role of private equity funds during the financial crisis, which may possibly
be answered only after some time has passed. Our paper cannot ultimately answer the
question of whether private equity investors are “visionaries” or “locusts”. Nevertheless, it
attempts to provide some insights into how private equity investors, who have become an
influential and important part of European economies in recent years, affect their portfolio
companies, in particular in terms of distress and bankruptcy risk.
In further research, we seek to take a closer look at the heterogeneity of private equity in-
vestors in Europe and how this heterogeneity affects financial distress risk and bankruptcy
rates. In particular, we will investigate the impact of investor type (independent private
equity investor, bank-related private equity investor, etc.), since institutional diversity is
very pronounced in Europe and since these investors’ differing goals, know-how and gov-




Variable description and sources
DEPENDENT DESCRIPTION
VARIABLES
ZM-, O-, Z-score Measures of financial distress. Formulas for the calculation
of the measures are presented in Section 3. Source: Amadeus
Bankruptcy Binary variable that takes a value of one if the firm goes




Buyout and buyout characteristics
BUYOUT Dummy variable that takes a value of one for buyout firms
within the time period 2000-2008 and zero for non-buyout
firms. Source: Zephyr
POST Dummy variable that takes a value of one for buyout firms
in the years after a buyout transaction and zero for the
years prior to the transaction and for control firms. Source:
Zephyr
FAVORABLE Dummy variable that takes a value of one for buyouts that
occur in years with favorable debt market conditions and
zero for buyouts that occur in years with unfavorable debt
market conditions and for control firms. Source: Datas-
tream, Zephyr
UNFAVORABLE Dummy variable that takes a value of one for buyouts that
occur in years with unfavorable debt market conditions and
zero for buyouts that occur in years with favorable debt mar-
ket conditions and for control firms. Source: Datastream,
Zephyr
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SYNDICATED Dummy variable equal to one for syndicated buyouts and
zero for stand-alone buyouts and for control firms. A trans-
action is classified as syndicated if the number of private
equity funds is disclosed and is larger than one. Source:
Zephyr
STAND-ALONE Dummy variable equal to one for stand-alone buyouts and
zero for syndicated buyouts and for control firms. A trans-
action is classified as stand-alone if the number of private
equity funds is disclosed and equals one. Source: Zephyr
EXPERIENCED Dummy variable equal to one for buyouts in which the aver-
age PE investor experience exceed one, zero otherwise (buy-
outs with inexperienced investors and control firms). We
proxy the experience of each PE investor in a particular
transaction by the number of all transactions this PE in-
vestor carried out prior to this transaction. If the “name”
of the acquirer is management byuout team, private individ-
uals, or similar (i.e., there is information in this field, but the
name is not explicitly disclosed), we set the dummy equal to
zero. If the name is missing completely, the dummy variable
is set to missing. Source: Zephyr
INEXPERIENCED Dummy variable equal to one for buyouts with inexperi-
enced investors (average PE experience in this transaction
is one or below) and zero for buyouts with experienced in-
vestors and for control firms. We proxy the experience of
each PE investor in a particular transaction by the number
of all transactions this PE investor carried out prior to this
transaction. If the “name” of the acquirer is management
byuout team, private individuals, or similar (i.e., there is
information in this field, but the name is not explicitly dis-
closed), we set the dummy equal to one. If the name is




AGE Natural logarithm of one plus the age of the firm in 2010.
Source: Amadeus
SIZE Natural logarithm of one plus total assets. Source: Amadeus
Economic environment
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman-index. Sum of the squares of each
company market share in an industry, country, and year.
Source: Amadeus
CONFIDENCE Business confidence indicator. Source: OECD
CREDIT Domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP.
Source: Worldbank
GROWTH Real economic growth. Source: World Competitiveness
Yearbook
BANKRUPTCY LAW Time to discharge in bankruptcy. Source: Armour and
Cumming (2008)





In each industry and country, buyout firms and non-buyout firms constitute a separate
estimation sample for matching regressions. In order to obtain a sufficient number of
potential matching companies in each industry, we use the 1-digit NACE Rev. 2 industry
classification. Within each of these industry-country groups, year by year, we apply logit
models with the dependent variable buyout to calculate the firms’ propensity scores. As
independent variables we use the logarithms of total assets and age in the year prior to
the transaction for the buyout firms and one-year lagged values of these variables for the
non-buyout firms.
The 945 models provide propensity scores which express the firms’ conditional probability
to be acquired by a PE investor. We identify the matching partners for each buyout firm by
minimizing the propensity score distance between buyout and non-buyout firms (nearest-
neighbors criterion). Three main methodological issues arise in matching (see Dehejia and
Wahba, 2002): whether to match with or without replacement, which matching method
to apply and, finally, how many control firms to match to each buyout firm. We choose
to match with replacement. Thus, each buyout firm can be matched to the nearest non-
buyout firm, even if a control firm is matched more than once. Matching with replacement
produces less-biased matches. We apply the nearest-neighbor method. We select the three
best control firms (propensity scores are closest to that of the buyout firm).
In order to meaningfully implement matching, it is necessary to condition on the support
common to both buyout and non-buyout companies (Heckman et al., 1998). Implementing
the common support condition ensures that any combination of characteristics observed
in the buyout group can also be observed in the control group. As a common support
approach we employ the minima and maxima comparison. The basic criterion of this
approach is to delete all observations whose propensity score or variable of interest is
smaller than the minimum and larger than the maximum in the opposite group (see
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). In addition, we check whether the matching procedure is
able to balance the distribution of the relevant variables in both the control and buyout
group (“balancing property”). Thus, we compare the buyouts with a full sample of non-
buyouts and with a matched control group.
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The decision on how many control firms to match with each buyout firm results in a
trade-off between bias and precision of the estimates. By using more comparison firms,
the precision of the estimates increases, but the bias increases as well. As robustness
checks, we use one-to-one matching and caliper matching within a maximum distance of
25% propensity score standard deviation of controls to buyouts (see Cochran and Rubin,
1973). The former considers the first nearest neighbor, whereas the latter considers all
control firms for which the propensity score difference is within a predefined radius. Caliper
matching is more efficient as long as the distributions of the propensity scores of buyouts
and non-buyouts overlap. The approach identifies as many control firms as are available
within the calipers, which could be a large (small) number when many (few) good matches
are available. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1985) suggestion, we use a quarter
standard deviation of the propensity scores as caliper width. Our main results are robust
towards these alternative matching approaches.
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Number of buyouts by year, country and industry 









2000 44 2 13 5 11 
2001 69 1 9 3 8 
2002 53 2 22 13 20 
2003 88 10 56 37 36 
2004 139 12 96 62 66 
2005 264 38 157 121 124 
2006 349 81 218 188 141 
2007 457 71 320 219 213 
2008 379 47 260 164 185 
Total 1842 264 1151 812 804 
Country      
Austria 18 3 13 11 7 
Belgium 85 13 47 36 37 
Denmark 55 2 51 30 24 
Finland 49 7 40 32 15 
France 441 67 252 185 198 
Germany 207 32 152 109 88 
Greece 4 1 3 3 1 
Ireland 9 0 5 0 7 
Italy 124 25 75 56 53 
Luxembourg 2 1 1 2 0 
Netherlands 121 15 74 50 57 
Portugal 22 2 14 8 10 
Spain 165 40 93 84 64 
Sweden 126 11 97 68 43 
United Kingdom 414 45 234 138 200 
Total 1842 264 1151 812 804 
Industry       
Manufacturing, mining and quarrying 618 90 388 280 276 
Trade, transportation and storage 397 55 245 175 178 
Administration and support services 330 49 202 147 139 
Information and communication 153 25 100 67 68 
Financial and insurance activities 146 12 104 63 60 
Public administration, education 61 10 32 23 24 
Construction 57 9 29 22 22 
Other services 51 11 29 22 23 
Real estate activities 26 3 20 12 13 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 3 0 2 1 1 
Total  1842 264 1151 812 804 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics for buyouts, control firms and all non-buyouts 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics        
 Total Assets (th. Euros) 
Age 
(years) ZM-score O-score Z-score 
      
(1) Buyouts (median) 19802 14 -1.3771 0.5111 2.4903 
(2) Control firms (median) 20139 16 -1.2061 0.6191 2.2609 
(3) Full sample non-buyouts (median) 297 9 -0.6326 0.9064 2.3873 
      
Ranksum test (1) vs. (2) 0.69 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Ranksum test (1) vs. (3) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 
      
No. observ. (1) 1842 1842 1504 581 1376 
No. observ. (2) 5342 5342 4340 1809 3747 
No. observ. (3) 33,778,242 32,288,668 20,594,489 12,895,619 16,994,347 
      
Panel B: Balancing property      
 median mean    
(1) Buyouts 0.0007 0.0033    
(2) Control group 0.0007 0.0030    
Test 0.9282 0.3844    
 
Panel A of this table reports medians of the variables total assets, age, and the indices measuring 
financial distress – Zmijewski-score, O-score and Z-score – for (1) the sample of firms that were 
involved in a buyout in 2000-2008 in the EU-15 compared to (2) the matched control group and to (3) 
the full sample of non-buyouts. The full sample of non-buyouts includes all firms not involved in a 
buyout which operate in country-industry-years where at least one buyout was executed. The data for 
the firms involved in buyouts and control firms correspond to the year before the transaction. The data 
for the full sample of non-buyout firms correspond to the whole time period from 2000 to 2008. Panel 
B shows the propensity scores of the samples of buyouts and control firms as well as tests for the 
equality of means (t-test allowing for unequal variances) and the equality of distributions (Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney ranksum test) between both groups. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
The number of observations varies across items due to data availability.  
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Table 3 
Median values and median changes from the pre-transaction period to the post-transaction period for buyout and control firms 
 
 Values  Changes   
 ZM-score (higher values indicate larger distress) 
Year (transaction year=0) t=-3 t=-2 t=-1 t=1 t=2 t=3 -1/1 -1/2 -1/3 
Buyouts (median) -1.2022 -1.2493 -1.3771 -1.2053 -1.2285 -1.3508 13.9123*** 13.6600*** 23.5356*** 
Control firms (median) -1.1867 -1.1780 -1.2061 -1.3441 -1.2637 -1.3730 -3.7778** -3.2540** -6.2178* 
Ranksum test 0.5782 0.7548 0.0348** 0.0788* 0.5337 0.3685 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
No. observ. (buyouts) 1227 1387 1504 965 674 457 857 605 413 
No. observ. (control firms) 3295 3812 4340 3019 2104 1405 2837 1972 1306 
 O-score (higher values indicate larger distress) 
Year (transaction year=0) t=-3 t=-2 t=-1 t=1 t=2 t=3 -1/1 -1/2 -1/3 
Buyouts (median) 0.5794 0.5246 0.5111 0.5602 0.5687 0.6389 3.4612*** 2.0423 8.6399*** 
Control firms (median) 0.6174 0.6092 0.6191 0.6057 0.6220 0.5649 -0.4132** -0.5850 -0.6424 
Ranksum test 0.2580 0.0078*** 0.0004*** 0.6112 0.4683 0.1581 0.0001*** 0.1301 0.0007*** 
No. observ. (buyouts) 507 553 581 360 222 165 245 150 108 
No. observ. (control firms) 1380 1619 1809 1274 873 594 963 619 401 
 Z-score (lower values indicate larger distress) 
Year (transaction year=0) t=-3 t=-2 t=-1 t=1 t=2 t=3 -1/1 -1/2 -1/3 
Buyouts (median) 2.3437 2.4575 2.4903 2.3715 2.3328 2.4435 -6.6952*** -11.9328*** -10.3538** 
Control firms (median) 2.3508 2.2910 2.2609 2.3613 2.3249 2.2723 5.3638*** 5.6296*** 8.9846*** 
Ranksum test 0.9298 0.0016*** 0.0001*** 0.6379 0.8293 0.1551 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 
No. observ. (buyouts) 1122 1278 1376 814 590 389 722 519 344 
No. observ. (control firms) 2909 3318 3747 2453 1734 1110 2295 1610 1015 
 
This table shows medians of the indices measuring financial distress – Zmijewski-score, O-score, and the Z-score – for the sample of firms involved in a buyout in 
2000-2008 in the EU-15 and for the control firms. The variables are presented for a time horizon of three years prior to the transaction to three years after the 
transaction. The changes (in percentage points) are measured from the year prior to the buyout through the third year following each buyout (year -1 to years 1, 
2, and 3). We test for the equality of distributions (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney ranksum test) between the two groups of firms. Moreover, we test whether the 
changes are significantly different from zero (denoted by asterisks) by using a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for medians. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. The number of observations varies across items due to data availability. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Panel regressions for buyouts and control firms 
 
 
 ZM-score O-score Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
POST 0.2079*** 0.1514*** 0.0484*** 0.0550*** -0.1271*** -0.0937*** 
 (0.052) (0.039) (0.013) (0.013) (0.037) (0.029) 
Y_t-1   0.4012***  0.1871***   0.3015*** 
   (0.015)  (0.018)   (0.017) 
HHI 0.0467 -0.0571 -0.0488 -0.0215 0.2016** 0.2763*** 
 (0.089) (0.118) (0.046) (0.052) (0.087) (0.091) 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes 
F-value 8.1764 71.9198 16.7207 22.3977 4.2998 30.2234 
No. observ. 43,348 35,549 17,135 12,508 38,960 31,552 
 
This table reports the coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from panel regressions with the indices measuring financial distress – Zmijewski-score, O-
score and Z-score – as dependent variables. POST is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for buyouts in the years after a buyout transaction. Y_t-1 denotes a 
lagged dependent variable. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index measuring market concentration. All regressions include a constant, year and firm fixed 
effects. Dependent variables definitions are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by company. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 




Median values and median changes from the pre-transaction period to the post-transaction period  
(syndicated vs. stand-alone transactions, transactions with experienced vs. inexperienced PE investors) 
 
Panel A: Syndicated vs. 
stand-alone transactions Values  Changes 
 ZM-score (higher values indicate larger distress) 
Year (transaction year=0) t=-3 t=-2 t=-1 t=1 t=2 t=3 -1/1 -1/2 -1/3 
Syndicated (median) -0.8336 -1.0236 -1.1786 -1.0940 -1.1004 -0.5699 0.0820 0.0233 0.6751* 
Stand-alone (median) -1.3300 -1.2760 -1.4171 -1.1873 -1.2568 -1.2773 0.1846*** 0.2066*** 0.3612*** 
Ranksum test 0.0153** 0.1531 0.0328** 0.6705 0.8734 0.0794* 0.2124 0.4004 0.5672 
No. observ. (syndicated) 194 219 232 138 92 45 130 87 42 
No. observ. (stand-alone) 792 867 923 552 362 237 484 320 214 
 O-score (higher values indicate larger distress) 
Year (transaction year=0) t=-3 t=-2 t=-1 t=1 t=2 t=3 -1/1 -1/2 -1/3 
Syndicated (median) 0.6973 0.5938 0.6050 0.5794 0.6980 0.8785 0.0303 -0.0172 0.1731*** 
Stand-alone (median) 0.5684 0.5255 0.4889 0.5668 0.5687 0.6726 0.0524*** 0.0652** 0.1086*** 
Ranksum test 0.0298** 0.2940 0.0599* 0.7654 0.6691 0.0729* 0.4639 0.3611 0.7100 
No. observ. (syndicated) 86 90 92 54 28 18 44 23 13 
No. observ. (stand-alone) 319 358 358 208 115 78 136 77 49 
 Z-score (lower values indicate larger distress) 
Year (transaction year=0) t=-3 t=-2 t=-1 t=1 t=2 t=3 -1/1 -1/2 -1/3 
Syndicated (median) 2.2530 2.2287 2.2687 2.2221 1.8621 1.9405 -0.0307 -0.1161 -0.1027 
Stand-alone (median) 2.3350 2.4857 2.5391 2.3542 2.4331 2.4834 -0.1036*** -0.1713*** -0.1591** 
Ranksum test 0.4310 0.2338 0.0385** 0.3688 0.0528* 0.3181 0.3286 0.4922 0.7276 
No. observ. (syndicated) 192 216 225 126 75 38 122 73 35 




Panel B: Experienced vs. 
inexperienced investors Values  Changes 
 ZM-score (higher values indicate larger distress) 
Year (transaction year=0) t=-3 t=-2 t=-1 t=1 t=2 t=3 -1/1 -1/2 -1/3 
Experienced  (median) -1.2135 -1.2137 -1.3335 -1.0341 -1.1025 -0.8930 0.1620*** 0.1336*** 0.5549** 
Inexperienced  (median) -1.2293 -1.3410 -1.5088 -1.3948 -1.4967 -1.6550 0.1690** 0.1786* 0.1995 
Ranksum test 0.2346 0.3744 0.1383 0.0474** 0.0470** 0.0004*** 0.6038 0.4653 0.0299** 
No. observ. (experienced) 575 629 665 412 275 167 366 248 150 
No. observ. (inexperienced) 550 601 644 382 251 170 341 226 157 
 O-score (higher values indicate larger distress) 
Year (transaction year=0) t=-3 t=-2 t=-1 t=1 t=2 t=3 -1/1 -1/2 -1/3 
Experienced (median) 0.5639 0.4830 0.4889 0.6063 0.6045 0.6813 0.0524** -0.0000 0.1179*** 
Inexperienced (median) 0.5950 0.5952 0.5113 0.5533 0.5409 0.6169 0.0418** 0.0759* 0.0681* 
Ranksum test 0.8265 0.1636 0.2277 0.7016 0.6851 0.5595 0.5994 0.6878 0.1236 
No. observ. (experienced) 229 251 242 151 88 57 106 61 35 
No. observ. (inexperienced) 245 259 279 154 82 60 109 60 44 
 Z-score (lower values indicate larger distress) 
Year (transaction year=0) t=-3 t=-2 t=-1 t=1 t=2 t=3 -1/1 -1/2 -1/3 
Experienced (median) 2.3291 2.4684 2.4805 2.2581 2.1896 2.1794 -0.0753** -0.1447*** -0.1294** 
Inexperienced (median) 2.3982 2.5038 2.5377 2.5548 2.5419 2.6604 -0.0842* -0.1070* -0.1193 
Ranksum test 0.3476 0.4766 0.3175 0.0131** 0.0060*** 0.0266** 0.7367 0.4082 0.0900* 
No. observ. (experienced) 524 585 620 339 234 139 312 214 124 
No. observ. (inexperienced) 507 553 586 322 215 141 283 191 128 
 
This table shows medians of the indices measuring financial distress – Zmijewski-score, O-score, and the Z-score – for the samples of syndicated and stand-
alone transactions (Panel A) as well as for the samples of transactions with experienced and inexperienced PE investors (Panel B). The variables are presented 
for a time horizon of three years prior to the transaction to three years after the transaction. The changes (in percentage points) are measured from the year prior 
to each buyout through the third year following each buyout (year -1 to years 1, 2, and 3). We test for the equality of distributions (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-
sum test) between the two groups of transactions. Moreover, we test whether the changes are significantly different from zero (denoted by asterisks) by using a 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for medians. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The number of observations varies across items due to data 






Probability of bankruptcy  
 
  All buyouts  & controls 
All buyouts &  
all non-buyouts 















logit IV logit logit logit logit logit logit logit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Buyout and buyout characteristics         
BUYOUT -0.0002 -2.6990 0.0005       
 (0.002) (3.104) (0.002)       
FAVORABLE    -0.0013   -0.0082   
    (0.002)   (0.005)   
UNFAVORABLE    0.0075      
    (0.005)      
SYNDICATED     -0.0022   -0.0024  
     (0.002)   (0.003)  
STAND-ALONE     0.0002     
     (0.001)     
EXPERIENCED      -0.0043***   -0.0069* 
      (0.002)   (0.004) 
INEXPERIENCED      0.0023    
      (0.002)    
Firm characteristics         
AGE -0.0003*** 0.0062*** -0.0018 -0.0037*** -0.0031*** -0.0035*** -0.0039* -0.0021 -0.0028 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SIZE -0.0014*** 0.0004 -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0011*** -0.0012*** -0.0011* -0.0009 -0.0011* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ZM-score  0.0015***       
   (0.000)       
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Economic environment         
CONFIDENCE -0.0173*** -0.0240*** -0.0149*** -0.0172*** -0.0155*** -0.0148*** -0.0169*** -0.0171*** -0.0131*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
CREDIT -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH -0.0098*** -0.0313*** -0.0089*** -0.0095*** -0.0078*** -0.0076*** -0.0087*** -0.0074*** -0.0060*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
BANKRUPTCY LAW -0.0001 0.0007*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CPI 0.0258*** 0.0627*** 0.0196*** 0.0253*** 0.0217*** 0.0213*** 0.0218*** 0.0200*** 0.0157*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
chi2/F 240.14 45.00 277.74 242.63 199.23 222.97 68.64 72.44 104.46 
No. observ. 7,184 7,216,964 6,174 7,184 5,718 6,307 1,842 1,463 1,613 
 
This table presents the marginal effects from cross-sectional logit estimations in Models (1) and (3) through (9) and from IV regressions in Model (2) with the 
dependent variable BANKRUPTCY, which takes a value of one if the firm goes bankrupt in the time period of 2000-2010 and a value of zero otherwise. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. All regressions include a constant and industry fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by country and industry. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
